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PROOF OF GUILT IN CAPITAL CASES-AN UNSCIENCE
WILLARD J. LASSERS
The author is a member of the Chicago Bar. He is on the Board of Directors of the Illinois Division
of the American Civil Liberties Union. Mr Lassers' article is based upon a research project of a special
committee of the Illinois Division of the ACLU.*
To what extent do the police and prosecution,
in cases where death is the sentence for murder,
avail themselves at the trial of the techniques of
modern science in establishing guilt? So far as we
are aware, no prior investigation of this matter has
been conducted.
The question is important, its ramifications ex-
tending far beyond the small number of individuals
sentenced to death in any one year (60 to 80) and
the still smaller number executed (7 in 1965 and 1
in 1966). If it appears that the police and prose-
cution do not make full use of current technology
in death cases, then it seems a fair assumption that
still less use is made of such methods in murder
cases where the death penalty is not sought and in
other non-capital criminal prosecutions. Presuma-
bly the prosecution makes the most thorough in-
vestigation and has the most positive proof of
guilt in those cases where the extreme penalty is
sought. If the resources of science are employed at
all, one would expect them to be utilized the most
where the heaviest penalty is sought.
There is another related reason for investigating
the use of science in murder prosecutions. In 1964,
in the Escobedo decision, and again in 1966 in the
Miranda decision, the Supreme Court of the United
States placed radical restrictions on the prosecution
in obtaining admissible confessions from persons
in custody. Few issues in law enforcement are more
emotion-laden. Civil libertarians (and we include
ourselves) believe that conviction by confession,
among its other evils, kills inducement to good
police work. Others view confessions as essential to
law enforcement, claiming that in many instances
there is no other way to solve crimes. We do not
presume to resolve this dispute. Surely, however,
data on the utilization of scientific techniques is
*The committee members were: Martin Baron,
Mary Thale, Richard Whitney, Robert Spitzer, James
B. Osgood, Beverly Williams, Paula Gorney, and
Chris Mfay. The committee expresses its indebtedness
for the assistance of Carol Blomgren, Winifred Meeks,
Audrey Dulaney, Richard Fried, Judith Siegel, and
Diane Reichenberger.
relevant to the controversy. A showing of failure to
make full use of modern methods tends to support
the view that reliance on confessions has retarded
growth of scientific methods of crime fighting.
There is a third reason for interest in the topic:
it throws some light upon a related, but different
question, that is, the extent to which the police
and prosecution avail themselves of scientific tech-
niques in ascertaining the identity of the criminal,
apart from the use of such evidence in the courts.
The state of the art as used to convict ma, reflect
the state of the art as used to catch the accused. We
are concerned here, however, solely with scientific
evidence in court.
Let us stress an important point. Our attention
is directed solely at the use of scientific evidence to
determine the identity of the individual responsible
physically for the death of the victim. We were not
concerned with scientific testimony as to the nu-
merous "state of mind" issues that arise in a
murder trial, such as mental capacity, ability to
form an intent to kill, the "voluntary" character
of a confession, etc. These issues are bcyond the
scope of this paper.
We think our study shows an incredible lag in.
the employment of modern methods. The prosecu-
tion does use scientific evidence in upwards of 25%
of all cases, but it relies almost exclusively on three
forms of such evidence, the newest of which is 40
years old: firearms identification (so-called "bal-
listics"), blood typing, and fingerprint comparison.
We deem this fact highly disturbing, not because
of the percentage (since there is no standard for
judging whether it is high or low), but because it
indicates stagnation. And it indicates something
more and worse: that the scientific process stands
at the periphery of the judicial fact finding inquiry,
not integrated as it ought to be in everystep of the
investigative and prosecution process.
Regarding the defense, the record is dismal. It
hardly ever uses scientific evidence, and then its
efforts generally are limited to helpful admissions
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on cross-examination from prosecution experts. We
shall comment below on tie reason for this situa-
tion.
These conclusions are based on a review of sub-
stantially all Illinois capital cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Illinois since 1950, and all cap-
ital cases in the United States for 1963, 1964, and
1965 which have been reviewed by state or federal
appellate tribunals. Sentences imposed in 1966
have not yet been reviewed by higher tribunals.
We chose, for several reasons, to study capital
cases-cases tailor-made to appraise the use of
technology by the prosecution:
I. As previously stated, scientific evidence is
more apt to be used in capital cases than in
other cases;-
2. The liniited number of such cases per year
permits examination of every case. Hence
we need not rely on a sample.
3. Because of the penalty, almost every capital
case is appealed, usually to the highest court
of the state. Hence, there are prepared a
verbatim record of the testimony, or a full
summary; briefs by the prosecution and de-
fense; and a written opinion by the court.
The latter is hearly always published; it usu-
ally contains a detailed recital of the facts,
,nd is readily avitilable in law libraries.
W6 became interested in our topic during the
.ourse of another study. During 1964-1965, for
other purposes, the Illinois Division of the Amer-
ican Civ il Liberties Union conducted a survey of
all cases in Illinois since 1950 where the defendant
was sentenced to death. Upon reading the couft
opinions, it seemed to us that there was heavy
reliance in these cases on confessions, witness testi-
mony, and other traditional modes of proof.
Science seemed to play a subordinate role. Our
interest piqued, we decided to restudy the cases,
addiiig the cases decided subsequently. Our pro-
cedure was as follows: we read all of the court
opinions (in some cases there were both state and
federal court opinions or more than one state court
opinion), and, in addition, we examined the "ab-
stract of record" which contains substantially all
of the trial testimony in narrative form.
-During the period 1950-1966, there were 42
capital cases that came before the Supreme Court
of Illinois. The decision on the initial appeal to that
court, and the subsequent disposition, are shown
in Table I. Three cases of the 42 had to be excluded
because there was no published opinion by the
Supreme Court of Illinois or by any other court.
TABLE I
CAPITAL CASES IN ILLINOIS 1950-1966
Judgment affirmed by Illinois Supreme Court
Executed 11*
Sentence commuted 2
Died of natural causes 1
Suicide 1
Further legal proceedings or com-
mutation pending 7
Discharged by federal courts 1
Total
Judgment reversed and new trial granted





* Includes two cases where Illinois Supreme Court
refused review. See text.
* Excluded .are 10 cases where the trial court has
imposed the death sentence but the case has not been
reviewed. Among the 10 is one woman.
One detendant died while his case was pending on
review, and two individuals were executed without
any appellate review of their decisions because
Illinois law at the time granted review in the
Illinois Supreme Court to those convicted of non-
capital felonies, but made review in capital cases
discretionary. In these two cases, review was
denied by the court. Further, in these two cases,
no abstract was available.
Now to the meat of the matter: Of the 39 cases,
some form of scientific evidence was introduced in
15 cases (38%). In these such cases, firearms iden-
tification (ballistics) testimony was introduced on
11 occasions. In two cases there was testimony
from an expert that because of the condition of a
bullet, no such examination was possible. Blood
type evidence was introduced on two occasions,
and fingerprint evidence on two occasions. (We
have considered one palm print as fingerprint
evidence.) No other form of scientific evidence was
introduced in any case by the prosecution.1
1 In one robbery-murder case, the defendant was
convicted of robbery. A sawed-off shotgun "similar
to" the murder weapon was found in the possession
of an accomplice, together with a length of gun barrel
and portion of a stock. Scientific evidence was intro-
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There was but a single case where scientific
evidence was introduced by the defense. Seven
years after the initial state court trial, the defend-
ant was granted a federal court hearing. In these
proceedings, for the first time, the defendant had
an opportunity to have a defense expert examine a
pair of shorts which the prosecution contended
were stained with the blood of the victim. The
victim, aged 8, had been sexually attacked and
murdered. At the hearing, this expert testified
that the stains were paint and not blood as the
prosecution had claimed in the ,original trial.
Further, in this proceeding it was shown that the
prosecution had not revealed to the defendant, at
the original trial, a crime lab report that a hair
found in the vagina of the child was not defend-
ant's. The conviction was set aside by the Supreme
Court of the United States because of the suppres-
sion of evidence regarding the paint.
We were taken aback by our findings. Illinois is
a leading urban, industrial state and yet the
foundation of all methods of scientific evidence
employed by the prosecution in these cases was
established 40-60 years ago. Fingerprinting dates
from the development of a workable system of
classifying the prints in the 1890's and firearms
identification in the middle 1920's. Blood groups
were discovered in the 1900's.
These methods are not only old, but all three
suffer defects. Firearms identification, of course, is
of value only where the weapon is a gun and both
bullets (or shells) and the alleged murder weapon
are found by the prosecution. But firearms iden-
tification does not enlighten us on the crucial
question, namely, "Who fired the gun?". True,
in the context of a specific trial, it may be a link in
a chain leading to the defendant.
Fingerprints where found can be almost conclu-
sive, but in some situations they are valueless.
Thus, if the defendant is accused of murdering his
wife with his own gun, his fingerprints in the house
are meaningless. His fingerprints on his own gun
are scarcely more important.
Blood grouping evidence, as presented, suffers
its own defect. In the usual case, the prosecution's
evidence is that the victim had blood of a specific
type (A, AB, B or o), that blood of that same type
was found, say, on the defendant's garments, and
that defendant has blood of another type.
The weakness of this evidence is that among
duced that the barrel and the stock had been sawed
off the gun. Since the murder case is not yet decided
by the Illinois Supreme Court, the case is not included.
white Europeans about -15% have Type A, 10%
Type il, 5% Type AB and 40% Type o. In the
usual case, victim and defendant have either Type
A or o. Hence, if the defendant has any blood on
his garment, there is nearly a 50% chance that it
is of the same type as the victim.
After analyzing the Illinois data, we asked our-
selves next whelher the Illinois cases represented
an isolated phenomenon. Perhaps if we reviewed
the national picture for recent years the results
would be different. We regret to say that the
pattern is essentially the same. An initil problem
was to determine the cases for study.
There is essentially no coordination betwedn the
records of the police, the prison, and the court, nor
is there uniformity among the states regarding the
stage in the trial process at which a death sentence
is impose(], and, thus, becomes reportable as such.
We decided to employ the federal records as the
reliable starting point. We obtained from the
Bureau of Prisons copies of the work sheets for the
years 1963, 1964, and 1965 which were used in the
preparation of its publication National Prisoner
Stalislics-Executions. These work sheets gave us
the name of every individual sentenced to death
during each of these years, the date of sentencing,
offense, sex, race, and (late of birth. We disregarded
all cases where death sentences were imposed for
crimes other than murder but included cases where
an individual was sentenced to death for rape and
murder.
The next step was to examine the decisions in all
cases which have been taken to a higher court and
decided by that court. Cases not appealed, or
pending an appeal, were not included in our analy-
sis.
There were, altogether, 230 individuals listed on
the government work sheets for the years 1963,
1964, and 1965: 81 cases in 1963; 89 cases in 1964;
and 60 cases in 1965. (See Table II for disposition
on those cases on review.)
The next step was to find, photcopy, and read
all available court opinions. For this portion of our
study, we had to rely on the court opinions. We
could not, as we did in the Illinois cases, read the
"abstract" which contains, somewhat condensed,
the testimony of each witness. There may be cases
where scientific evidence was presented at the
trial by the prosecution or defense but such evi-
dence was not mentioned in the court opinion. For
this reason, we must be circumspect in our conclu-
sions in this portion of the study. But we feel
justified in drawing some conclusions, and partir-
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ularly when we know that the -defense presents a
written brief to the court containing a statement
of facts. This statement is subject to comment by
the prosecution in its brief. There is oral argument
before the higher court and then a study of the case
by the court. Because it is a capital case, we assume
a thorough study of the matter by the court.
In this light, our approach to the opinions was
as follows: If the court decided a case on an issue
which did not require a full statement of facts, or
if the court did not attempt to state the facts fully,
we did not include the case for analysis. We in-
cluded only those cases where the court purported
to give a complete statement of the facts. To us it
seems unlikely that there were many cases where
evidence seriously pressed upon the court by pros-
ecution or defense, scientific or otherwise, would
escape mention by the court. Further, to the extent
that such evidence did go unmentioned, there is no
reason to believe it differs as to .type from such
evidence which was mentioned.
Let us look first at the 1963 data which is the
most complete. Of 81 cases, 8 are still undecided.
We eliminated from our study 16 cases, because the
reported decision failed to include a complete state-
ment of facts. Thus, we were left with 57 cases
subject to analysis. Of the 57 cases, the prosecution
relied on confessions in 31 cases (54%).
We found that scientific evidence of one form
or another was introduced in 15 of these 57 cases
(26%) and that there were 22 instances in all where
scientific evidence was presented.2 The breakdown
as to type of evidence is as follows:
Blood Typing- 5 cases
Firearms identification (Bal- '
listics)- 5 cases
Fingerprint identification- 3 cases
Other- 9 cases
22 cases
There were 19 California cases included among the
57. Of the 15 cases throughout the entire country
in which scientific evidence was introduced, 10 were
from California. Thus there were only 5 cases from
other parts of the country. These.included 2 cases
(companion cases) from the District of Columbia,
I from Georgia, 1 from Massachusetts, and 1 from
Texas.
2 In two Arizona cases (companion cases) there was
testimony that bloodstains and hair were found on a
rock, but it is not clear that the blood and hair were
identified as such by expert testimony. These cases
are not included.
Let us consider these 5 cases first: In the District
of Columbia cases, the scientific evidence employed
consisted of blood type testimony, plus testimony
that a bloodstained heel mark found on the de-
ceased had been made by the heel of the boot of
one of the defendants. In the Georgia case, the
scientific evidence was a firearms identification
test of a shotgun shell. In the Massachusetts case,
the prosecution, in addition to the introduction of
firearms identification testimony, introduced the
testimony of a medical examiner as to the course
of a bullet. In the Texas case, the scientific evidence
was that a gas line had been cut by defendant's
pipe cutters.
Based upon these cases, our conclusion is that
the scientific evidence introduced by the prosecu-
tion in the 1963 cases, while more varied than in
the Illinois cases, was nevertheless limited in scope
ahd imaginativeness.
In the California cases there was a more sophis-
ticated approach. In addition to blood typing,
firearms, and fingerprint testimony, other forms of
scientific evidence were introduced in 6 cases
These decisions give an indication of what might
be done generally.
In one case, defendants were convicted of mur-
dering a bartender. in their car. In addition to
blood group evidence respecting the blood of de-
ceased and blood stains in the car, there was
evidence that numerous fibers taken from the vic-
tim's shoes matched those found in the defendants'
automobild, that hairs found in the automobile
matched those of the victim; and that red paint
found on the floor mat of the defendants' automo-
bile came from the shoes of the victim.
The other five cases involved a typewriter com-
parison, 2 forensic medicine cases (presence of se-
men), one soil matching case, and one matching
of bloody footprints.
For 1964, there were 89 cases, of which 54 were
subject to analysis (See Table II). Six cases were
eliminated as duplications of names previously
entered by the Bureau of Prisons for 1963.3
Confessions were relied on in 31 cases (57%).
Scientific evidence was employed in 18 cases (33%)
representing, in all, 10 states. California contrib-
uted scientific evidence in 3 of these cases.
This was evidently due to an oversight since it is
the announced policy of the Bureau to list an indi-
vidual only once on its annual report and then in the
year in which he is first sentenced to death. If the con-
viction is set aside and he is subsequently sentenced
to death, he is not supposed to be included in the figures
for the later year.
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TABLE I
INDIVIDUALS SENTENCED TO DEATH FOR 'MURDER 1963-1965
DISPOSITION OF CASES
(SOURCE: NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS 1963-1965, PUBLISHED COURT DECISIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE)
1963 1964 1965
Total cases reported by Bureau of Prisons
Affirmed
Affirmed, sentence reduced
Affirmed as to guilt, reversed and remanded as to penalty only
Reversed and remanded
Total decided on merits
Not decided on merits:
Pending in reviewing court
Duplicate entry of prior year
Reversed or remanded without opinion
Facts not stated
Deceased before decision of reviewing court
New trial granted by trial court-Followed by life sentence
New trial granted by trial court-Pending
Remanded, decision reserved
Declared insane. No appeal
Total not decided on merits
Total decided on merits
Facts not stated in opinion























The -other" cases, as for 1963, reveal what
evidence can be found when the police are prepared
to approach an investigation scientifically. Texas
identified the hat of a defendant by hair com-
parison. Pennsylvania presented evidence that the
pants of a defendant, accused of murder of a boy,
were splattered with brain tissue. Pennsylvania
also, in a murder and possible rape case, presented
evidence the victim had had intercourse within 10
days of death and that there were semen stains on
the defendant's shorts. No semen was found in the
vagina of the victim, however. California brought
in a handwriting expert to testify that a defendant
had made a sketch of a savings and loan associa-
tion. The defendant was charged with murder
committed during a robbery of the association.
California also produced expert testimony as to the
course of a bullet in a grocery robbery-murder.
Arkansas produced the cast of a foot print at a
murder scene which matched the defendant's. In
another case it identified liquid found in a car as
kerosene. The defendant was charged with the
murder of several members of his family and set-
ting the home on fire with kerosene. Alabama
charged a defendant with the rape of a girl and the
murder of a conservation officer who came to her
aid. There was testimony that there was blood and
fatty material of human origin on a knife and that
the tail light assembly of the defendant's car had
paint on it which matched the paint of the car of
deceased. This evidence was significant because of
other evidence that the defendant's car had col-
lided with the car of the deceased.
One case of particular interest was from Arkan-
sas. The defendant was accused of the rape-mur-
der of a housewife surprised in her home while
ironing. There was testimonv as to the presence of
Vol. 58
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semen in the vagina of the deceased, but the most
dramatic evidence, even though not "scientific" in
character, was a burn mark on defendant arrested
shortly after the crime. The victim had put up a
struggle and the outline of the burn matched ex-
actly the impression of her iro .
Unquestionably the most bizarre and fascinating
case arose from Ohio. Defendant and one Riddle
checked into a motel in Stark county. Subse-
quently, Riddle's body was found in a burned auto,
some distance from the motel in Wayne county.
At the defendant's trial for murder in Stark county,
he testified that, upon returning to the motel room
after a brief absence, he found Riddle dead. He
placed the body in his car and drove around- for
two days. Defendant chose County Line Road,
which divides Stark and Wayne counties, for the
final scene. At the top of a hill he soaked the body
and car interior in gasoline, ignited it and started
the car, in flames, down the hill. The State claimed
Riddle was alive when incinerated. This certainly
cast grave doubt on the reliability of defendant's
tale and his unusual behavior, and it counted
heavily against him. Scientific evidence in two
crucial areas supported his strange version. Both
the State and the defense established by expert
testimony -that Riddle had severe heart disease--
his life .xpectancy, according to his doctor, could
only be foretold from day to day. Further, there
was expert testimony by the defense, largely con-
curred in by the State, that carbon monoxide is
present in bodies of victims burned while alive and
that the blood of Riddle contained no carbon mon-
oxide. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction and granted a new trial in part on the
ground guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, and in part on the ground -(intriguing to
lawyers) that venue did not lie in Stark County.
In this case, but for scientific evidence, an in-
nocent man might well have been convicted, be-
cause of grossly incriminating circumstances and
his own odd behavior.
For 1965, the data is still fragmentary. Of 60
cases, 37 cases remain undecided and 5 had to be
rejected for many of the same reasons that com-
pelled rejection of cases in 1964. Included among
the 5 was one duplicate from a prior year. Thus,
only 18 cases could be analyzed. Of these 18 cases,
confessions were presented in 7 cases (39%).
Scientific evidence was introduced in 6 cases
(33%). In three instances (two in Georgia and one
in South Carolinat) firearms identification testi-
mony was introduced. In one California case, de-
fendant's palm print was fognd in the cab of a
taxi driver .he was accused pf murdering. In a
Texas case, defendant was accused of murdering a
woman in her home at night. A hair, found on de-
fendant's pistol, matched the victim's; defendant's
shoes had mud on them like that in the victim's
yard, and plaster casts of foot prints in the yard
matched defendant's shoes. In one New Jersey
case, the prosecution charged robbery and murder,
followed by burning the corpse. To prove the
robbery, there. was scientific testimony that no
gold was found among the remains, whereas there
was testimony that deceased customarily wore a
gold ring
All in all, we think the record is dismal. True,.
there are occasional cases where evidence out of the
ordinary is presented, but on the whole, it seems
clear that scientific evidence is presented in a
minority of the cases. And, when it is presented,
almost without exception it consists of one of the.
three standbys used for decades.
Thus, during a 3-year span, we could study 129
cases (57 + 54 + 18). In all, there were 50 occa-
sions (22 + 20 + 8) where scientific evidence was
introduced in 39 cases (15 + 18 + 6). Of the 50,
the old standbys accounted for 26 instances (13 +
10 + 3) or about 50%. Most of the 24 remaining
instances employed unsophisticated or even ele-
mentary techniques. The only instances we con-
sider as exceptions are these 7 cases: Texas pipe
cutter case, the impressive array of facts in the
California bartender case, and the California soil
matching case, the Texas hat case, the Pennsyl-
vania boy murder case, the Alabama conservation
officer murder, and the Texas array of facts in the
cab driver case.
The "array" cases such as the two mentioned
above illustrate that once scientific evidence is
sought more than one item of evidence may be
found.
In reading the cases we were struck by the fact
that in almost every instance there was no attempt
to conceal the fact that murder had been commit-
ted. In fact, we recall only two exceptions: in a
California case, the murderers concocted an elab-
orate plot to murder the husband-wife motel keep-
ers, mask their disappearance, hide the bodies, and
assume ownership of the motel. In one Illinois
case (Vincent Ciucci), a husband shot his wife and
children and then set the house afire to make the
deaths appear as if due to fire. Allthis, because he
had a girl, named by a strange trick of fate, Carol
Amora.
WILLARD J. LASSERS
Perhaps murder masked as natural death is rare.
Or perhaps when discovered, capital sentences are
not imposed. But we suspect that given the lack of
sophisticated techniques in convicting the mur-
derer where murder is obvious many murderers
successfully conceal their crimes.
We have shown that the defense almost never
utilizes scientific evidence. For the indigent defend-
ant, the reasons are Qbvious. Even if he is given
competent counsel, he is not provided an investi-
gative staff and funds. Even the defendant who
has funds has problems. By the time counsel is
retained, the trail is usually cold. The key evidence
frequently is in the hands of the prosecution, it may
be impossible for the defense to obtain access to it.
Finally, a truly scientific study of a criminal case
requires a broad spectrum of experts and a coor-
dinator who knows what can be done and who can
do it. Such individuals and galaxies of specialists
exist only in the largest cities.
The Ohio motel case is the oustanding illus-
tration of the use of scientific evidence by the de-
fense. There, it was a significant fact in the reversal
of a capital sentence. It was achieved by bringing
in Dr. Milton Halpern, Chief Medical Examiner of
New York City to testify. The prosecution sought
to counter the defense, but its presentation was
flawed by an omission of a key fact from the report
of one of its experts.
We do not suggest for a moment that scientific
evidence can or should replace traditional modes
of proof. Thus, for example, the California motel
keepers' case demonstrates the value of careful,
patient police work in assembling a massive case.
Only a small part of the evidence was "scientific"
as such, but in a broad sense, the presentation was
truly scientific.
Nevertheless, factual determinations can be
exceptionally complex. Consider for example, the
storm of controversy on the issue whether the
bullet which hit President Kennedy also struck
Governor Connally. We should bring to bear every
resource, including traditional techniques, to re-
solve these issues.
Modern technology ought to play a much greater
role than it does now. We have the capacity to in-
vestigate the most distant reaches of the universe,
and to tear apart the atom, yet, when we put men
on trial for their lives we bring to bear almost none
of this vast scientific capacity.
If we are to make full use of science and be
truly scientific-and fair to the accused, the task
will be hard for several reasons. We cannot simply
establish a super laboratory in Washington to
which police throughout the country can send
material for analysis. A national laboratory, far
beyond the scope of the BI laboratory would be a
forward step, but to be truly effective, it must draw
upon a national spectrum of experts. Beyond this
we must have well trained local investigators of
technical knowledge and imagination. The national
laboratory can scarcely rise above the material sent
to it and this in turn will depend upon the skill of
the local investigators.
There is another dimension to the problem.
Science must be used not merely to convict the
guilty, but to free the innocent. It is inevitable
that the police, being first on the scene, will mar-
shal the evidence. Road blocks which bar examina-
tion of the physical evidence by the defense must
fall. And, even today, the prosecution-how often
no one knows-engages in the scandalous practice
of concealing exonerating evidence, permitting its
expert to tell half truths and engaging in similar
disreputable practices. We do not make this charge
lightly. It is based upon case after case documented
in the courts. Despite repeated denunciation of
such practices by the courts, they have continued,
and we fear they will continue.
If we are to really use science to solve crime, we
must not mar the achievement by the stain of
dishonest methods which are the antithesis of
science. A growing professional spirit among in-
vestigators may lessen the problem. Yet, so long as
men's advancements and reputations depend on
results, there will be the temptation to trifle wtih
the facts. The criminal prosecution is an adversary
process. Largely, this process serves us well. But
when the prosecution stoops to suppression and
misrepresentation of evidence, it hides the truth
the trial is designed to elicit. Suppression and mis-
representation occur, moreover, not only because
of calculation or malice, but also because every in-
vestigation must proceed not upon a witless col-
lection of facts, but also upon a hypothesis. We
like to see our hypotheses proved right and as we
become more committed to them the less easy it is
for us to admit their error or even to see the pos-
sibilitv for error. Hence, the manifest importance
of countering this inevitable tendency. For this,
the defense must have full and unrestricted access
to the facts. It must have well paid, competent
investigators and it must have full access to
scientific laboratories. Only then will we bring the
potentialities of our technology to the service of
justice.
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